

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
NATIONAL ESTIMATES BOARD

7 July 1951

MEMORANDUM FOR: Mr. Allan Evans, OIR
General John Weckerling, G-2
Captain Ray Malpass, ONI
Colonel Edward H. Porter, AFON
Captain R. G. McCool, JIG

SUBJECT : TERMS OF REFERENCE: NIE-40: POTENTIAL
MILITARY, ECONOMIC AND SCIENTIFIC ACCRE-
TIONS TO THE USSR RESULTING FROM THE
ACQUISITION OF WESTERN EUROPE BEFORE
MID-1952

1. The attached draft terms of reference are for-
warded for review.

2. It is requested that your representative meet with
us at 2:30 on Wednesday, 11 July, in Room 116, South
Building.

Executive Secretary

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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
OFFICE OF NATIONAL ESTIMATES

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SUBJECT: TERMS OF REFERENCE: NIE-40: POTENTIAL MILITARY,
ECONOMIC AND SCIENTIFIC ACCRETIONS TO THE USSR
RESULTING FROM THE ACQUISITION OF WESTERN EUROPE
BEFORE MID-1952
(For Consideration by IAC representatives)

THE PROBLEM

To estimate the potential military, economic and scientific accretions to the USSR resulting from the acquisition
*
of Western Europe before mid-1952.

SCOPE

The study would first (Section I) evaluate the military, economic and scientific potential of Western Europe in terms of its usefulness to the USSR. The study would then (Section II) examine, under the assumption of general war between the

* Continental Europe west of the Iron Curtain, including Finland, Sweden, Norway, Denmark, West Germany, Switzerland, Italy, Yugoslavia, France, Spain, Portugal, The Netherlands, Belgium, Luxembourg, but excluding the UK and all colonial possessions of the Western European countries.

US and the USSR, the factors which would retard or prevent full Soviet utilization of the area's war potential. No attempt will be made to reach conclusions regarding a Soviet intent to overrun Western Europe, but certain limited conclusions may emerge which might shed light on the role of Western Europe in the Kremlin's over-all strategic planning.

QUESTIONS BEARING ON THE PROBLEM

I. WHAT MILITARY, ECONOMIC AND SCIENTIFIC ADVANTAGES WOULD ACCRUE TO THE USSR FROM ACQUISITION OF THE TERRITORY AND TOTAL RESOURCES OF WESTERN EUROPE?

(This section is intended to examine the Western European situation "as is", disregarding such factors as US counter-action, destruction by Western forces, or interdiction of the conquered areas' normal trade with non-Soviet areas.)

A. MILITARY

1. Defensive advantages, or reduction of potential military threat to the USSR (denial to the US of manpower, air bases, land approaches to the USSR, etc.).
2. Offensive advantages, or increased facilities for military action against the US, the UK and other

non-Soviet countries resulting from acquisition of bases, trained manpower, munitions, etc.

B. ECONOMIC AND SCIENTIFIC

1. What would be the over-all accretion to the Soviet military potential from Western European stocks, resources and productive capacity?
2. In what particular lines would the economic and scientific potential of Western Europe make the greatest contribution to Soviet strength?

II. UNDER THE ASSUMPTION OF GENERAL WAR BETWEEN THE US AND THE USSR, WHAT FACTORS WOULD TEND TO RETARD OR PREVENT SOVIET UTILIZATION OF WESTERN EUROPE'S POTENTIAL?

(A precise estimate of the damage which could be inflicted by the various military and economic courses of action available to the US is not expected.)

A. MILITARY AND POLITICAL FACTORS

1. Overextension of Soviet military forces.
2. Necessity for providing large occupation forces.
3. Administrative problems.

4. Difficulties of organizing and controlling non-Soviet armed forces.

B. ECONOMIC FACTORS

1. What basic problems would confront the USSR in integrating the economies of the newly occupied area with that of the present Soviet orbit and in exploiting Western European resources?
 - (a) Conversion and standardization problems.
 - (b) Transportation problems.
 - (c) Specific fields in which the USSR might be forced to rely on Western European military, scientific, and technical personnel.
 - (d) Problem of non-cooperation and obstruction by Western European labor forces.
2. To what degree is the Western European economy dependent on imports from non-Soviet areas? To what extent could these imports be supplied by the USSR?
3. To what extent could Western European resources and productive capacity supplement those of the USSR?